「オークション理論勉強会」の編集履歴（バックアップ）一覧はこちら
「オークション理論勉強会」(2013/02/09 (土) 16:02:44) の最新版変更点
追加された行は緑色になります。
削除された行は赤色になります。
*オークション関連の論文等を輪読します。
時間・場所：2012年冬学期毎週月曜10:30-- @磯野研究館3階小集会室
日程：
|月日|担当|論文 |備考|
|10/15|西村|Jullien and Mariotti (2006)|12:30--|
|10/22|西村|Jullien and Mariotti (2006)||
|10/29|村山|Crawford et al. (2009)||
|11/05|津川|Borgers (2010), Chapter 5||
|11/12|津川|Borgers (2010), Chapter 5||
|11/19|無藤|Pai and Vohra (2011)||
|11/26|無藤|Pai and Vohra (2011)||
|12/03|中田|Turocy (2008)||
|1/07|西村|Cai, Relay, and Ye (2007)|12:55--14:25|
|1/21|村山|Murayama (2013)|12:55--14:25|
|1/28|西村|Cai, Relay, and Ye (2007)|12:55--14:25|
|2/04|中田|TBA|12:55--14:25|
|2/15||特別セッション|下記参照|
**特別セッション---ミニ・ワークショップ
- 日時：2月15日(金)10:30--16:45
- 場所：マーキュリータワー5階3506室（通常と異なりますのでご注意ください）
|10:30--12:00|鶴岡|"公共事業の入札に関する実証研究について"||
|13:30--15:00|津川|TBA||
|15:15--16:45|西村|"Informed Monopolist Problem in an Auction Environment"||
-Jullien and Mariotti (2006), "[[Auction and the informed seller problem>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.008]]," Games and Economic Behavior, 56(2), 225-258.
-Crawford, Kugler, Neeman, and Pauzner (2009), "[[Behaviorally optimal auction design: Examples and observations>http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.377]]," Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(2-3), 377-387.
-Borgers (2010), "[[An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design>http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/LectureNotes.pdf]]".
-Pai and Vohra (2011), "[[Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Buyers>http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxtYWxsZXNocGFpfGd4OjM0NDk5YmUzZTJiZGQyNDk]]," working paper.
-Turocy (2008), "[[Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.009]]," Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), 155–179. (See also Kotowski (2011), "[[Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.00]]," Games and Economic Behavior, 72(2), 448-451)
- Cai, Relay, and Ye (2007), "[[Reserve price signaling>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.005]]," Journal of Economic Theory, 135(1), 253-268. (See also Lamy (2010), "[[Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.009]]," Journal of Economic Theory, 145(6), 2498-2504)
- Murayama (2013), "Robust Predictions under Limited Depth of Reasoning," Master thesis, Hitotsubashi University.
----
----
*オークション理論の教科書を輪読します。
Text:[[Vijay Krishna, "Auction Theory">>http://www.amazon.co.jp/Auction-Theory-Second-Vijay-Krishna/dp/0123745071/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1301640567&sr=8-1]]
関連文献：[[Paul Klemperer, "Auctions: Theory and Practice">>http://www.amazon.co.jp/Auctions-Practice-Toulouse-Lectures-Economics/dp/0691114269/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=english-books&qid=1301991555&sr=1-2]], [[Paul Milgrom, "Putting Auction Theory to Work">>http://www.amazon.co.jp/Putting-Auction-Churchill-Lectures-Economics/dp/0521536723/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1301991450&sr=8-2]]
時間・場所：毎週水曜14:00-@3506
日程：
|日時|担当|範囲 |備考|
|4/1| |打ち合わせ||
|4/4|津川|3.1-3.2||
|4/11|坂本|4.1-4.2||
|4/18|津川|4.3-4.4||
|4/25|西村|5.1-5.2 (p61-73)|16:00-@3506|
|5/2|白石|5.2-5.3 (p73-80)|16:00-@3506|
|5/10|白田|6.1-6.2|12:30-@3506|
|5/17|森|6.3-6.4|12:30-@3506|
|5/24|坂本|6.5-6.6|12:30-@3506|
|5/31|津川|7.1-7.3|12:30-@3506|
|6/7|西村|8.1-8.2|12:30-@3506|
|6/14|白石|8.3-8.4|12:30-@3506|
|6/21|白田|9.1-9.2|12:30-@3506|
|6/28|森|9.3-9.5|12:30-@3506|
|7/5|坂本|9.6-10.1 (p141-148)|12:30-@3506|
|7/12|津川|10.1-10.2 (p148-153)|12:30-@3506|
|7/19|西村|11.1-11.1.1|12:30-@3506|
|7/26|白石|11.1.2-11.2|12:30-@3506|
|9/2| |打ち合わせ|14:00-@3401|
|9/14|白石|12.1|14:00-@3506|
|9/21|鶴岡|12.2|14:00-@3506|
|10/5|白田| |14:00-@3506|
*オークション関連の論文等を輪読します。
時間・場所：2012年冬学期毎週月曜10:30-- @磯野研究館3階小集会室
日程：
|月日|担当|論文 |備考|
|10/15|西村|Jullien and Mariotti (2006)|12:30--|
|10/22|西村|Jullien and Mariotti (2006)||
|10/29|村山|Crawford et al. (2009)||
|11/05|津川|Borgers (2010), Chapter 5||
|11/12|津川|Borgers (2010), Chapter 5||
|11/19|無藤|Pai and Vohra (2011)||
|11/26|無藤|Pai and Vohra (2011)||
|12/03|中田|Turocy (2008)||
|1/07|西村|Cai, Relay, and Ye (2007)|12:55--14:25|
|1/21|村山|Murayama (2013)|12:55--14:25|
|1/28|西村|Cai, Relay, and Ye (2007)|12:55--14:25|
|2/04|中田|TBA|12:55--14:25|
|2/15||特別セッション|下記参照|
**特別セッション---ミニ・ワークショップ
- 日時：2月15日(金)10:30--16:45
- 場所：マーキュリータワー5階3506室（通常と異なりますのでご注意ください）
|10:30--12:00|鶴岡|"公共事業の入札に関する実証研究について"||
|13:30--15:00|津川|"Implementation under behavioral assumptions: survey"||
|15:15--16:45|西村|"Informed Monopolist Problem in an Auction Environment"||
-Jullien and Mariotti (2006), "[[Auction and the informed seller problem>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.008]]," Games and Economic Behavior, 56(2), 225-258.
-Crawford, Kugler, Neeman, and Pauzner (2009), "[[Behaviorally optimal auction design: Examples and observations>http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.377]]," Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(2-3), 377-387.
-Borgers (2010), "[[An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design>http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/LectureNotes.pdf]]".
-Pai and Vohra (2011), "[[Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Buyers>http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxtYWxsZXNocGFpfGd4OjM0NDk5YmUzZTJiZGQyNDk]]," working paper.
-Turocy (2008), "[[Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.009]]," Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), 155–179. (See also Kotowski (2011), "[[Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.00]]," Games and Economic Behavior, 72(2), 448-451)
- Cai, Relay, and Ye (2007), "[[Reserve price signaling>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.005]]," Journal of Economic Theory, 135(1), 253-268. (See also Lamy (2010), "[[Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.009]]," Journal of Economic Theory, 145(6), 2498-2504)
- Murayama (2013), "Robust Predictions under Limited Depth of Reasoning," Master thesis, Hitotsubashi University.
----
----
*オークション理論の教科書を輪読します。
Text:[[Vijay Krishna, "Auction Theory">>http://www.amazon.co.jp/Auction-Theory-Second-Vijay-Krishna/dp/0123745071/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1301640567&sr=8-1]]
関連文献：[[Paul Klemperer, "Auctions: Theory and Practice">>http://www.amazon.co.jp/Auctions-Practice-Toulouse-Lectures-Economics/dp/0691114269/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=english-books&qid=1301991555&sr=1-2]], [[Paul Milgrom, "Putting Auction Theory to Work">>http://www.amazon.co.jp/Putting-Auction-Churchill-Lectures-Economics/dp/0521536723/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1301991450&sr=8-2]]
時間・場所：毎週水曜14:00-@3506
日程：
|日時|担当|範囲 |備考|
|4/1| |打ち合わせ||
|4/4|津川|3.1-3.2||
|4/11|坂本|4.1-4.2||
|4/18|津川|4.3-4.4||
|4/25|西村|5.1-5.2 (p61-73)|16:00-@3506|
|5/2|白石|5.2-5.3 (p73-80)|16:00-@3506|
|5/10|白田|6.1-6.2|12:30-@3506|
|5/17|森|6.3-6.4|12:30-@3506|
|5/24|坂本|6.5-6.6|12:30-@3506|
|5/31|津川|7.1-7.3|12:30-@3506|
|6/7|西村|8.1-8.2|12:30-@3506|
|6/14|白石|8.3-8.4|12:30-@3506|
|6/21|白田|9.1-9.2|12:30-@3506|
|6/28|森|9.3-9.5|12:30-@3506|
|7/5|坂本|9.6-10.1 (p141-148)|12:30-@3506|
|7/12|津川|10.1-10.2 (p148-153)|12:30-@3506|
|7/19|西村|11.1-11.1.1|12:30-@3506|
|7/26|白石|11.1.2-11.2|12:30-@3506|
|9/2| |打ち合わせ|14:00-@3401|
|9/14|白石|12.1|14:00-@3506|
|9/21|鶴岡|12.2|14:00-@3506|
|10/5|白田| |14:00-@3506|
